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Posted on August 7, 2019June 29, 2023

EEOC Settlement Teaches Lesson on Extended Leaves of Absence as ADA Accommodation

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

An employee tells you that he was recently diagnosed with prostate cancer and needs a few weeks off for treatment, surgery and recovery.

Assume either you’re not an FMLA-covered employer or that the employee is not FMLA eligible.

Do you …

(a) Fire him.

(b) Deny the request and force him to quit to have the surgery.
(c) Grant the request, but ask the employee to provide medical information supporting the disability, the need for time off, and an expected return-to-work date.

I hope you picked “c.”

An Atlanta distributor of industrial supplies chose “a,” and it cost them $75,000 to settle an EEOC lawsuit. From the EEOC’s news release:

“Medical leave is a widely recognized accommodation, and in Mr. Smith’s case, could easily have been granted, preventing the firing of a valuable employee. However, instead of accommodating him, Vallen fired him less than 24 hours before his surgery,” said Antonette Sewell, regional attorney for the EEOC’s Atlanta District Office. …

Darrell Graham, district director of the Atlanta office, said, … “An employee should not be forced to risk termination for seeking leave to treat a medical condition, which can be a perfectly reasonable accommodation under federal law.”

Takeaways?

1. Unpaid time off can, and often does, qualify as a reasonable accommodation under the ADA, whether or not the FMLA applies. Moreover, if you fail to consider it as a reasonable accommodation, you’ve likely violated the statute.

2. Firing someone who asks for a few weeks off for cancer surgery is awful. It’s even more awful if you wait until the day before the surgery to do the firing.

3. Given the egregiousness of the violation, $75,000 seems light (although I don’t know all of the particulars of this employee’s damages).

Posted on July 23, 2019June 29, 2023

The 14th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Horrible Harasser

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

In its press release announcing a recently filed sexual harassment lawsuit, the EEOC says that a New York-based housing development and property management company violated Title VII when its owner and top executive repeatedly subjected female employees to crude sexual comments, called them sexually obscene names and showed them pornography.

And, as bad as that sounds, that description barely scratches the surface of what is actually alleged to have happened in this workplace.

The complaint that the EEOC filed fills in the blanks with disgusting details about the daily barrage of unwelcome and offensive misconduct.
    • The owner made crude remarks about his sexual interests, such as: that his “dick may not always work but my tongue will”; and that he “knows how to satisfy a woman” and “likes the way they [women] taste.”
    • The owner made unwelcome and sexualized comments about female employees’ bodies, such as: telling a female employee that her body was curvy and reminded him of his wife’s body, telling another that he admired her breasts, and telling another that he “felt like a kid in a candy store,” when she bent over.
    • When angry, the owner called female employees hostile, abusive, and demeaning names, such as: “cunts.”
    • The owner repeatedly put his hand down his pants and touched his genitals while speaking to female employees.
    • The owner showed female employees pornography on his cell phone.
The women say in the complaint that this egregiously offensive misconduct happened on daily or near-daily basis, that their complaints to the company’s CFO fell on deaf ears, and that it finally compelled them to quit.
I’m speechless, other than to say that if these allegations are true, “Congratulations, Birchez Associates and Rondout Properties Management of Kingston, N.Y., you’re the 14th nominee for the worst employer of 2019!”
Thanks to Janette Levey Frisch for bringing this story to my attention.

Previous nominees:

The 1st Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Philandering Pharmacist

The 2nd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Little Rascal Racist

The 3rd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is … the Barbarous Boss

The 4th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Flagrant Farmer

The 5th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Fishy Fishery 

The 6th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Diverse Discriminator

The 7th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Disability Debaser

The 8th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Lascivious Leader

The 9th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Fertile Firing

The 10th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Exorcising Employee

The 11th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the ****y Supervisor

The 12th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Disguised Doctor

The 13th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Excoriating Executives
Posted on July 17, 2019June 29, 2023

There Isn’t a Magic Number of Racial Slurs an Employee Must Prove to Establish a Hostile Work Environment

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

Jamie Ortiz (of Puerto Rican descent) worked for the Broward County, Florida, School Board in various capacities for nearly 20 years, including, from 2009 through 2017, as an auto mechanic in the district’s garage under the supervision of Michael Kriegel.

According to the testimony of both Ortiz and many of his co-workers, Kriegel had some issues with Puerto Ricans and other Hispanics, which he expressed to anyone who would listen, including Ortiz, on a daily basis.

  • Kriegel made offensive comments and jokes about Puerto Ricans, such as, “I’m around too many Puerto Ricans, I better carry my gun with me”; “we need to lock our toolboxes because we’re hiring too many Puerto Ricans”; “this New York Puerto Rican is on me”; “Puerto Ricans like to do their own thing, they don’t follow orders”; and “it ain’t right you Puerto Ricans are making more money than me.” Kriegel never used Ortiz’s name and instead called him “Puerto Rican.” Kriegel also used the ethnic slur “spic” “several times.”
  • Ortiz also testified that Kriegel harassed him “every day on any type of work order.” Kriegel would wait for him to finish his bus route and say things like, “your Puerto Rican ass think you can do whatever you want to do.” Another time, Kriegel criticized Ortiz for using a certain bus and stated that he was “going to write your Puerto Rican ass up.” Over Ortiz’s objections, these and other comments did not stop.
  • According to Ortiz’s coworkers, Kriegel used the terms “spic,” “lazy spic,” “knock-kneed spic,” “dumb spic,” and “wetback,” either specifically about Ortiz or about Hispanic people more generally. Kriegel also made other discriminatory comments, including “here comes the Puerto Rican gang, I need to call the cops”; “the damn Puerto Rican again, I’ve got to go see what this freakin’ Puerto Rican is doing, they’re all the same”; “I would rather have, you know, three more of these guys than a smelly Puerto Rican in here”; “spics come over here and they want to eat up all the benefits”; and “had a lot of niggers and spics apply, and we won’t need no more of them here.”

Amazingly, the district court granted the employer’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed Ortiz’s racial harassment claim. The 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, however, was not having it.

Here, a reasonable jury could conclude that Ortiz’s workplace was objectively hostile to a reasonable person in his position. First, for nearly a two-year period preceding Ortiz’s EEOC charge, the frequency of the harassment was daily or near daily. Ortiz reported that, from the beginning of 2013 through September of 2014, Kriegel made offensive comments and jokes every day about Puerto Ricans. Likewise, one of Ortiz’s coworkers stated that he heard discriminatory comments by Kriegel about people of Hispanic origin on a daily basis during the same time period. Other coworkers reporting hearing discriminatory comments on a less frequent but still regular basis. This evidence is not consistent with the type of “isolated” or “sporadic” conduct that is insufficient to meet Title VII’s threshold. Rather, it reflects a work environment “permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult.”

[T]here is no “‘magic number’ of racial or ethnic insults” that a plaintiff must prove. …

I am flabbergasted that a federal district court judge could conclude that these facts did not, as a matter of law, constitute a racially hostile work environment.

Indeed, I’d argue that even one “spic” or “wetback” is enough to create a hostile work environment. A daily barrage of these slurs is the definition of racially hostile work environment. Bravo to the appellate court for correcting a very poor decision.

Posted on July 2, 2019

There’s No Such Thing as ‘Reverse’ Discrimination

According to the New York Post, a Caucasian 20-year veteran attorney for the Legal Aid Society is suing her former employer for race discrimination. Among other issues in her lawsuit, she claims that she was denied a lateral move “because of ‘diversity considerations.’”
Do you know that some courts impose a different, higher legal standard for discrimination against white employees than for discrimination against African-American employees?

According to these courts, a non-minority employee asserting a claim of race discrimination must demonstrate background circumstances to support the suspicion that the defendant is that “unusual employer who discriminates against the majority.”

This is nonsense. Last I checked, EEOC is the “Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,” not the “Minority Employment Opportunity Commission.” A minority manager is just as capable of committing discrimination as a white manager. The law should not treat “reverse” discrimination any differently.

Discrimination is discrimination, period.

Applying different proof standards depending on the perpetrator of the alleged discrimination re-enforces the very stereotypes that our EEO laws intend to eradicate. Can we please remove from the law this idea of “reverse” discrimination, and just agree that discrimination is wrong regardless of the races of those accused of perpetrating it?

Also in The Practical Employer

The 12th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … 

Does the Attorney-Client Privilege Protect Harassment Probes Conducted By a Lawyer?

Abortion Discrimination = Pregnancy Discrimination

Posted on May 21, 2019June 29, 2023

You Just Discovered You Hired a Sex Offender. Now What?

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

A reader sent me the following question.

I worked for a grocery store. Can a child molester be employed by the grocery store? I reported it to the manager, and showed proof and nothing was done about it.

There’s a lot going on here. What does the law require an employer to do (if anything) under these circumstances? And what should an employer do when it discovers it is employing a sex offender?

Legally speaking, it depends on the state in which you are operating. Laws that mandate state sex offender registries are more commonly known as Megan’s Law. All 50 states and the District of Columbia maintain these sex offender registries that are open to the public via websites. As of 2016, there were 859,500 registered sex offenders in United States. Some of these Megan’s Laws expressly prohibit an employer from using the state sex offender registry information for employment purposes (California, for example). Ohio’s Megan’s Law has no such requirement. Because these law do vary from state to state, you should check with your lawyer before refusing to hire, or fire, a registered sex offender.

Separately, the EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on the Consideration of Arrest and Conviction Records in Employment Decisions under Title VII  prohibits an employer from instituting a blanket rule against the employment of anyone with a criminal history, including sex crimes. Instead, employers must make an individualized assessment of the employee’s fit for the specific job at issue in light of the criminal history, taking into consideration factors such as the facts or circumstances surrounding the offense, the length and consistency of employment history before and after the offense or conduct, rehabilitation efforts, and the essential functions of the job. Thus, the EEOC might take issue with a blanket policy against the employment of sex offenders in all cases.

These legal limits on an employer’s ability to fire a sex offender notwithstanding, I still see liability red flags that should make you very jumpy if you are deciding whether to hire or fire someone with this background. Specifically, what happens if you choose to employ this individual, and he or she commits a sex crime while on-the-clock or otherwise relating to the employment.

First, you should be worried about liability for negligent hiring/retention. An employer has an affirmative duty to protect its employees, customers, and anyone else that comes in contact with the business from risks of harm of which the employer knows or should know. If an employer hires or retains an individual despite knowledge of prior improper behavior (i.e., sex crimes), and the employee then sexually assaults someone, that injured party could argue the employer knew, or should have known, that the employee might hurt someone. You could even face liability for punitive damages for consciously disregarding for the rights and safety of other employees. This could potentially be a very expensive mistake for an employer to learn. And, I’m speaking from experience, having defended an employer in a case with these facts.

Second, I can envision an argument that the employment of a registered sex offender violates OSHA’s General Duty Clause, which requires employers to provide their employees with a place of employment that “is free from recognizable hazards that are causing or likely to cause death or serious harm to employees.” The courts have interpreted OSHA’s general duty clause to impose upon employers a legal obligation to provide a workplace free from conditions that cause, or are likely to cause, death or serious physical harm to employees. It’s not a stretch to imagine the employment of a registered sex offender violating this duty.

Separate from these legal issues that might drive you not to employ a sex offender, there are also workplace issues you’ll have to consider and manage. Since sex offender registries are mostly public, it’s not hard to envision a situation in which (1) an employee’s registration status becomes known in the workplace, and (2) it becomes fodder for gossip, discomfort, and scorn among co-workers. Not surprisingly, employees tend not to react well to news that one of their coworkers is a sex offender. They may demand you take immediate action and fire the sex offender, walk off the job in protest, or bully the sex offender into quitting. Do you want to deal with this level of discontent? Is a registered sex offender the mountain you’re willing to die on?

Thus, to address the question that started this discussion, if I’m an employer and I find out that I’m about to employ, or am employing, a registered sex offender, my decision is a relatively easy one. I’m either not hiring or firing. I’m all for rehabilitation and second chances, but in the case, let it be in someone else’s workplace.

Posted on March 13, 2019June 29, 2023

The 8th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Lascivious Leader

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

I can’t do any better of job than the EEOC did in describing the parade of horribles that one supervisor wrought at Sys-Con, a Montgomery, Alabama, general contractor:

According to the EEOC’s lawsuit, from December 2015 to May 2017, a supervisor at Sys-Con’s worksite at the Hyundai manufacturing plant in Montgomery, demanded sexual favors from two non-English speaking Hispanic female employees and watched pornographic videos in front of them. The EEOC further charged that the supervisor sexually assaulted one of the employees and sub­sequently taunted her, asking whether she “liked it.”

Thereafter, the EEOC said, the super­visor threatened to fire both his victims and their husbands, who were also Sys-Con employees, if they reported his harassment. When one of the employees refused his sexual advances, the supervisor terminated her.

For all of this, the EEOC settled the claims against Sys-Con for (what I consider to be) a paltry $70,000.

Folks, if you employ a supervisor who not only sexually assaults one of your employees but then taunts her about it after the fact, you might be the worst employer of 2019.

Big thanks to my friend Eric Meyer who brought today’s nominee to my attention at his Employer Handbook Blog.

Previous nominees:

The 1st Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Philandering Pharmacist

The 2nd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Little Rascal Racist

The 3rd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is … the Barbarous Boss

The 4th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Flagrant Farmer

The 5th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Fishy Fishery 

The 6th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Diverse Discriminator

The 7th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Disability Debaser

Posted on March 5, 2019June 29, 2023

The 7th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Disability Debaser

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

The 7th nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is an employer that (allegedly) permitted a nearly year-long campaign to malign and harass an employee living with ADHD and Tourette’s syndrome.

Melinda Crooke worked as a line worker for Herbruck Poultry Ranch, an egg farm in western Michigan. As noted above, she has ADHD, which causes her to be overtly talkative and sometimes confused, and Tourette’s syndrome, which manifests in head twitches, facial tics, uncontrolled arm movements, and occasional swearing. According to the lawsuit the EEOC filed on her behalf, all of her co-workers knew of her disabilities.

Crooke claimed that as soon as her supervisor learned of her disabilities, her harassment at the hands of said supervisor and some co-workers began. They called her “Mindy Tourette’s,” “Gabby,” “Motormouth,”and “Wandering Wanda.” They mocked her Tourette’s syndrome by biting their tongues and making exaggerated hand movements. And, after she complained to HR, the mockery only worsened. For example, her supervisor sped up the production line to make it harder for her to keep up, and followed her into the bathroom during breaks to berate her for wasting time. When she complained again to HR, she claims she was told there was nothing anyone could do.

As a result, she quit her job and went to the EEOC, which has now filed suit on her behalf. According to EEOC Trial Attorney Dale Price, “An employer cannot condone a work environment where an employee with an impairment is ridiculed because of it. It must step in to stop such behavior.”

Otherwise, you not only might get sued, but you just might end up as one of the nominees for the Worst Employer of 2019.

Previous nominees:

The 1st Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Philandering Pharmacist

The 2nd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Little Rascal Racist

The 3rd Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is … the Barbarous Boss

The 4th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Flagrant Farmer

The 5th Nominee for the Worst Employer of 2019 is… the Fishy Fishery 

The 6th Nominee for Worst Employer of 2019 Is … the Diverse Discriminator

 

Posted on January 29, 2019January 29, 2019

Public Sector Employers and Age Discrimination

employment law

When Mount Lemmon (Arizona) Fire District faced a budget crisis, it laid off its two oldest (and highest paid) full-time firefighters.

They sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The district argued that it did not violate any laws because it is too small to be considered an “employer” under the ADEA. Section 630(b) of the ADEA defines the term “employer” to mean any individual or company who has 20 or more employees. It states the term employer “also means a State or political subdivision of a State.”

The district argued that the two sentences should be read together to excuse any state or local government employer with fewer than 20 employees from complying with the ADEA. The district urged the court to adopt this interpretation because it is consistent with court decisions applying the minimum employee requirement to public employers under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The court disagreed with each of the district’s arguments. It held that by using the terms “also means,” Congress intended to add a second definition of the term “employer,” not clarify the prior definition. The court also noted that the ADEA is sometimes broader than Title VII due to the different language used in each statute. Mount Lemmon Fire Dist. v. John Guido, No. 17-587 (Nov. 6, 2018).

IMPACT: Public sector employers are subject to the ADEA and prohibited from discriminating against employees over age 40 based on age.

Posted on January 9, 2019June 29, 2023

What Does It Mean for Jobs to be “Substantially Equal” Under the Equal Pay Act?

Equal Pay Act substantially equalThe Equal Pay Act requires that an employer pay its male and female employees equal pay for equal work. The jobs need not be identical, but they must be substantially equal. Substantial equality is measured by job content, not job titles.

The Act is a strict liability law, which means that intent does not matter. If a women is paid less than male for substantially similar work, then the law has been violated, regardless of the employer’s intent.

This strict liability, however, does not mean that pay disparities always equal liability. The EPA has several built-in defenses, including seniority, merit, quantity or quality of production, or any other factor other than sex.

A recently filed case out of Boston delves into these issues.

According to CBS News, Elizabeth Rowe, the Boston Symphony Orchestra’s principal flutist, claims that her employer unlawfully pays the principal oboist (a man) about $70,000 more per year.

According to the lawsuit, “Both the principal oboe and principal flute are leaders of their woodwind sections, they are seated adjacent to each other, they each play with the Boston Symphony Chamber Players, and are both leaders of the orchestra in similarly demanding artistic roles.”

How did the oboist end up earning more? According to the lawsuit, the orchestra lured him away from the Metropolitan Opera Orchestra with the promise of higher pay. Rowe claims that she should be paid equally for similar work, regardless of the circumstances of his recruiting.

The orchestra claims that gender plays no role in how it sets salaries, which instead are determined by a variety of non-discriminatory factors, such as the difficulty of the oboe and its smaller pool of musicians.

What does it mean for two positions to be “substantially equal?’” According to the EEOC, employers should balance these five factors:

  • Skill: Measured by factors such as the experience, ability, education, and training required to perform the job. The issue is what skills are required for the job, not what skills the individual employees may have. For example, two bookkeeping jobs could be considered equal under the EPA even if one of the job holders has a master’s degree in physics, since that degree would not be required for the job.
  • Effort: The amount of physical or mental exertion needed to perform the job. For example, suppose that men and women work side by side on a line assembling machine parts. The person at the end of the line must also lift the assembled product as he or she completes the work and place it on a board. That job requires more effort than the other assembly line jobs if the extra effort of lifting the assembled product off the line is substantial and is a regular part of the job. As a result, it would not be a violation to pay that person more, regardless of whether the job is held by a man or a woman.
  • Responsibility: The degree of accountability required in performing the job. For example, a salesperson who is delegated the duty of determining whether to accept customers’ personal checks has more responsibility than other salespeople. On the other hand, a minor difference in responsibility, such as turning out the lights at the end of the day, would not justify a pay differential.
  • Working Conditions: This encompasses two factors: (1) physical surroundings; and (2) hazards.
  • Establishment: The prohibition against compensation discrimination under the EPA applies only to jobs within an establishment. An establishment is a distinct physical place of business rather than an entire business or enterprise consisting of several places of business. In some circumstances, physically separate places of business may be treated as one establishment. For example, if a central administrative unit hires employees, sets their compensation, and assigns them to separate work locations, the separate work sites can be considered part of one establishment.

I don’t enough about symphony orchestras to know how these factors all shake out in Boston. It seems to me, however, that a recruiting bump to lure someone from another employer is a solid “factor other than sex.”

Also read: Your 2019 Employment Law Compliance Checklist

If you have concerns that men and women in your workplace are being paid differently for similar work, you should audit you pay practices, and, if necessary, even them out, before the government or a plaintiff comes calling.

Posted on August 8, 2018June 29, 2023

Juicing Up the Reasonable Accommodation for a Diabetic Employee

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

Would you rather spend seven figures to lose a lawsuit, or $1.69 to allow a diabetic employee to drink a bottle of orange juice?

The answer should be pretty clear.

Or maybe not?

Linda Atkins, a former cashier at Dollar General, is a type II diabetic. She occasionally suffers from low blood sugar, to which she must quickly respond by consuming glucose to avoid the risk of seizing or passing out. When she asked her manager if she could keep orange juice at her register in case of an emergency, he refused, citing the store’s “Personal Appearance” policy (which prohibits employees from eating or drinking at registers).

In late 2011 and early 2012, Atkins suffered two hypoglycemic episodes. Because she worked alone and did not want to leave her register unattended, she took at bottle of orange juice from the store’s cooler and paid for it after the fact.

Shortly thereafter, a Dollar General Loss Prevention Manager audited the store to address employee theft and other merchandise “shrinkage” issues. Atkins admitted to drinking orange juice twice before paying for it because of a medical emergency. She was then fired for violating the employer’s “grazing” policy, which prohibits employees from consuming merchandise before paying for it.

The EEOC sued on behalf of Atkins, claiming that her ex-employer failed to reasonably accommodate her and discriminated against her because of her disability.

On appeal, the 6th Circuit had little difficulty concluding that the jury correctly found in favor of Atkins on her reasonable accommodation claim:

When she asked her store manager if she could keep orange juice at her register because of her diabetic condition, the manager told her “it’s against company policy” and to “[b]e careful of the cameras.” Once Atkins requested this reasonable accommodation, the employer had a duty to explore the nature of the employee’s limitations, if and how those limitations affected her work, and what types of accommodations could be made.… But that’s not what it did. The store manager categorically denied Atkins’ request, failed to explore any alternatives, and never relayed the matter to a superior.

And on her discrimination claim:

A company may not illegitimately deny an employee a reasonable accommodation to a general policy and use that same policy as a neutral basis for firing him. Imagine a school that lacked an elevator to accommodate a teacher with mobility problems. It could not refuse to assign him to classrooms on the first floor, then turn around and fire him for being late to class after he took too long to climb the stairs between periods. In the same way, Atkins never would have had a reason to buy the store’s orange juice during a medical emergency if Dollar General had allowed her to keep her own orange juice at the register or worked with her to find another solution. Happily for us, doctrine lines up with common sense.

This legal and common-sense error cost the employer a judgment of nearly $725,000 (which includes almost $450,000 in the claimant’s attorneys’ fees, and does not include what it paid its own legal team to fight this absurd fight). The bottle of OJ at issue was worth $1.69 (plus tax). Which is the better economic decision?

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

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