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Posted on August 8, 2017June 29, 2023

Don’t Let Off-the-clock Overtime Claims Become a Game of Rock, Paper, Scissors

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

Defending claims for off-the-clock work is one of the most difficult tasks employers face under the Fair Labor Standards Act.

An employee (or worse, group of employees) says, “I (we) worked, without compensation, before our shift, after our shift, or during our lunch; pay me (us).” Often, these employees have their own personal, detailed logs supporting their claims. And the employer has bupkis. It then must prove a negative (“You weren’t really working when you say you were”), which places the employer in a difficult and often unwinnable position. It’s a wage-and-hour game of rock-paper-scissors, where paper always beats air.

When we last examined Allen v. City of Chicago — a case in which a class of Chicago police officers claimed their employer owed them unpaid overtime for their time spent reading emails off-duty on their smartphones — an Illinois federal court had dismissed the claims, holding that most of the emails were incidental and non-essential to the officers’ work, and, regardless, the employer lacked specific knowledge of non-compensated off-duty work.

Last week — in what is believed to be the first and only federal appellate court decision on whether an employer owes non-exempt employees overtime for time spent off-duty reading emails on a smartphone — the 7th Circuit affirmed [pdf].

The court started its analysis with the basic principle that “Employers must … pay for all work they know about, even if they did not ask for the work, even if they did not want the work done, and even if they had a rule against doing the work.” From there, however, the court applied the rule first announced by the 6th Circuit in White v. Baptist Memorial Health Care, that an employer is not liable for unpaid, off-the-clock overtime if:

  1. the employer has a policy and process requiring that employees report off-the-clock work;
  2. employee(s) ignore the policy and do not report the off-the-clock work for which they are claiming unpaid overtime; and
  3. the employer does not prevent or discourage its employees from accurately reporting off-the-clock work and unpaid overtime.
Based on this rule, the 7th Circuit concluded that that the district court correctly held that the plaintiff-officers were not entitled to overtime compensation for their off-the-clock emailing.

Plaintiffs … worked time they were not scheduled to work, sometimes with their supervisors’ knowledge. They had a way to report that time, but they did not use it, through no fault of the employer …. Reasonable diligence did not … require the employer to investigate further.

In response, the officers argued constructive knowledge—e.g., the employer could have discovered the uncompensated work by comparing the time slips to email records—notwithstanding the employer’s policy. That argument failed, as the 7th Circuit correctly pointed out that the proper legal standard is should have known, not could have known, and that in the face of policy requiring the reporting of uncompensated off-the-clock overtime, an employer’s access to records does not constitute constructive knowledge.

What is the lesson for employers to take away from Allen, and White before it? Employers must have a reasonable process for employees to report uncompensated work-time, and must not prevent or otherwise discourage employees from using that process. Under the FLSA, it is the employee’s burden to show work during non-working time. A policy that underscores that onus by requiring employees to report times during which they were working “off-the-clock” will place employers in the best position to defend against claims for compensation for unreported, off-the-clock time, and should nullify any personal time logs or other records the employees have to the contrary.

In other words, now is as good a time as any to dust off your employee handbook, open to your “overtime” policy, and, as soon as possible, make sure it contains this language to best insulate your pay practices from dangerous and expensive off-the-claim claims.

Posted on August 3, 2017June 29, 2023

Would You Let Your Employer Microchip You?

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

Our family dog, Loula, is microchipped. Our vet offered it to us as a service when Loula first joined our family. It provides some peace of mind in the sad event that Loula goes missing and ends up in a shelter or vet office. They would be able to read the rice-grain-sized RFID chip embedded in her leg, discover that she belonged to us, and return her.

Loula, however, is a dog, she’s not an employee. Which is why I’m troubled that a Wisconsin employer has decided to offer microchip implants as a “service” to its employees.

From The New York Times:

On Aug. 1, employees at Three Square Market, a technology company in Wisconsin, can choose to have a chip the size of a grain of rice injected between their thumb and index finger. Once that is done, any task involving RFID technology — swiping into the office building, paying for food in the cafeteria — can be accomplished with a wave of the hand.

There is nothing illegal about this practice. Employees are providing their consent to the procedure, the implant is 100 percent voluntary and is reasonably safe. Indeed, 50 out of Three Square Market’s 80 employees volunteered for the implant, an astonishingly positive response.

But, if you ask me, chipping employees sure is creepy. No matter the current intent, it’s just a tad too Orwellian for my taste. Or, if you don’t believe me, ask Alessandro Acquisti, professor of information technology and public policy at Carnegie Mellon University’s Heinz College, like The New York Times did:

Another potential problem, Dr. Acquisti said, is that technology designed for one purpose may later be used for another. A microchip implanted today to allow for easy building access and payments could, in theory, be used later in more invasive ways: to track the length of employees’ bathroom or lunch breaks, for instance, without their consent or even their knowledge.

“Once they are implanted, it’s very hard to predict or stop a future widening of their usage,” Dr. Acquisti said.

Today’s cafeteria payments are tomorrow’s location tracking. Microchips are for dogs, not employees. Let’s keep it that way.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com.

Posted on August 2, 2017June 29, 2023

Is Joint Employment the Issue That Unites Our Divided Government?

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

I cannot recall a time when our government has been more divided across ideological and party lines. (I don’t count the early 1860s, because that’s not a time a can remember.) Thankfully, an issue has come along to build a peace bridge over the streets and through the halls of Washington, D.C.

This issue — joint employment, via the Save Local Business Act [pdf], which clarifies that two or more employers must have “actual, direct, and immediate” control over employees to be considered joint employers.

Some background.

Two years ago, in Browning-Ferris, the NLRB rewrote its long-standing rules on joint employment. It expanded and liberalized its standard for when two employers qualify as “joint employers” over a group of employees, rendering each liable for the labor-law violations of the other. It accomplished this expansion by adding “indirect” or “potential” control, in addition to “actual” control, as the lynchpin of joint employment.

Subsequently, the DOL followed suit, adopting the same rule, although in recent months it has backed off.

The Save Local Business Act, introduced with bipartisan support, looks to undo that which the NLRB has wrought, by restoring the “direct control” test for joint employment in both the NLRA and the FLSA.

A person may be considered a joint employer in relation to an employee only if such person directly, actually, and immediately, and not in a limited and routine manner, exercises significant control over the essential terms and conditions of employment (including hiring employees, discharging employees, determining individual employee rates of pay and benefits, day-to-day supervision of employees, assigning individual work schedules, positions, and tasks, and administering employee discipline).

Proponents of the bill tout its “commonsense framework” that gives “much needed clarity and certainty” to “this harmful scheme” which threatens an estimated 1.7 million jobs by holding secondary employers (such as franchisors and contractors) liable for the alleged sins of primary employers (such as franchisees and sub-contractors).

While support for this bill is not universal, if this bill can get Dems and the GOP working together to solve a problem, then it must be doing something right.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com.

Posted on July 27, 2017June 29, 2023

Treat Harassment by Non-employees no Differently Than Harassment by Employees

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer
Consider the following lawsuit the EEOC filed against a California senior-care provider:

The civil rights agency found that Rashon Sturdivant, an experienced care provider, faced daily harassment, including racially offensive remarks about “brown sugar” and “black butts,” requests to perform sexual acts, and lewd comments about her body. The client also masturbated in front of her and groped her when she performed routine tasks like helping him sit up in bed or cleaning him. Although Sturdivant and other care providers informed R. MacArthur of his conduct, the EEOC charges that the employer failed to act on these complaints and also retaliated against Sturdivant by refusing to reassign her to another client.

This employer mistakenly assumed that the law does not cover employees harassed by non-employees. Nothing is further from the truth. In fact, an employer’s obligations to an employee harassed by a non-employee are exactly the same as if the alleged perpetrator was an employee — to take prompt remedial action to ensure that the harassment stops and does not reoccur. In other words, the employer must:
  1. Be prompt. Upon receipt of a complaint of harassment, a business must act as quickly as reasonably possible under the circumstances to investigate, and if necessary, correct the conduct and stop from happening again.
  2. Be thorough. Investigations must be as comprehensive as possible given the severity of the allegations. Not every complaint of offensive workplace conduct will require a grand inquisition. The more egregious allegations, however, the more comprehensive of an investigation is called for.
  3. Consider preliminary remedial steps. While an investigation is pending, it is best to segregate the accused(s) and the complainant(s) to guard against further harassment or worse, retaliation. Companies place themselves in a much worse position if they are too lax instead of too cautious.
  4. Communicate. The complaining employee(s) and the accused should be made aware of the investigation process—who will be interviewed, what documents will be reviewed, how long it will take, the importance of confidentiality and discretion, and how the results will be communicated.
  5. Follow through. There is nothing illegal about trying remedial measures less severe than ending the relationship in all but the most egregious cases. A valued customer may be no less valued after asking an employee about her underwear, for example. If the conduct continues, however, the discipline must get progressively more harsh. If you tell an employee that termination is the next step, you must be prepared to follow-through.

I’ll give EEOC San Francisco District Director William R. Tamayo the final word on this issue:

The customer is not always right. The law requires employers to ensure that workers are protected from sexual harassment, even when that workplace is non-traditional, like a client’s home, and even when the alleged harasser is a customer or client.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. To comment, email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on July 24, 2017June 29, 2023

Court: Religious Accommodation Request Isn’t Protected Activity

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

A Minnesota federal court has ruled that an employee’s request for a religious accommodation did not qualify as protected activity to support the employee’s retaliation claim. EEOC v. North Memorial Health Care (D. Minn. 7/6/17) involves a hospital that withdrew a conditional job offer to a nurse after she disclosed that she was a Seventh-day Adventist and could not work Friday nights because of her religion.

As an accommodation, the employee offered to find a substitute for Fridays on which she was scheduled, and that she would work if she could not find one. The hospital denied her request, and, ultimately, the EEOC filed suit on her behalf claiming that the hospital retaliated against her because of her religious accommodation request.

In dismissing the EEOC’s claim, the court applied strictly interpreted Title VII’s retaliation clause.

Under Title VII, an employee engages in protected activity when she either (1)”oppose[s] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII]” or “ma[kes] a charge, testifie[s], assist[s], or participate[s] in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing under [Title VII]. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). …

Applying the plain language of the statute, the court concludes that requesting a religious accommodation is not a protected activity. Under the opposition clause, a plaintiff must communicate her opposition to a practice that she believes, in good faith, is unlawful. … [M]erely requesting a religious accommodation is not the same as opposing the allegedly unlawful denial of a religious accommodation. …

Neither is [the employee]’s accommodation request protected activity under the participation clause. There is no evidence that [she] “made a charge, testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or hearing” prior to her termination.

While I applaud this court’s strict reading of the retaliation statute, employers should not view this lone district court case as a mandate empowering them to deny accommodation requests free from risk. The law on this issue is far from settled. Instead of using this case as a justification to deny an accommodation request, employers should view it as a reason to have an open dialogue with a religious employee requesting an accommodation.

How should this case have played out?

  • Employer: “Nurses must work every other Friday night.”
  • Employee: “My religion prevents me from working Friday nights.”
  • Employer: “Then you cannot work here.”
  • Employee: “What if I find a substitute for the Fridays that I am scheduled, and I’ll work any Friday night shifts for which I can’t find one.”
  • Employer: “Let’s give that a try.”
No harm to the employer; it has its Friday nights covered. And, if the employee fails to locate coverage and fails to show at work, it becomes an attendance issue, not an accommodation issue. At that point, the employer can then discipline or terminate without fear of retaliation liability for denying the accommodation request, no matter what the law says.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. To comment, email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on June 29, 2017June 29, 2023

One State Looks to put Enforcement Muscle Behind Workplace Concealed Carry Law

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

It’s been six months since Ohio made it illegal for employers to prohibit employees (or anyone else for that matter) from storing a firearm in their vehicles on the employer’s property. This law, however, lacks any specific statutory teeth (sort of). If Ohio legislators get their way, this omission will soon change.

Am. Sub. H.B. 49 proposes to add the following language:

A business entity, property owner, or public or private employer … may be found liable in a civil action for injunctive relief brought by any individual injured by the violation. The court may award injunctive relief it finds appropriate.

I’m not in love with this statute authorizing injunctive relief (especially when I’ve heard multiple clients balk at the original law). Yet, it’s a whole lot better than the original amendment, which proposed an award of compensatory damages, costs, an attorneys’ fees for a violation.

While I remain convinced that a law permitting employees to store firearms in their vehicles parked at work is a horrendous idea, it is the law, and it is about to have some enforcement teeth behind it. So, instead of complaining about it and threatening non-compliance, now is the time to invest in implementing an Active Shooter / Emergency Action Plan, so that your business knows how to respond in the event this evil enters your workplace.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on June 28, 2017June 29, 2023

More on Why Holding Lawyers Liable for Retaliation to a Client’s Employee is a Bad Ruling

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

Yesterday’s post discussing Arias v. Raimondo as the worst employment-law decision of 2017 was way more controversial than I imagined. To me, it’s a no-brainer.

It’s dangerous for courts to hold an employer’s lawyer liable for retaliation against the employees of the lawyer’s client. It will chill an attorney’s ability to give proper advice to one’s client, because anything that remotely could result in an employee suffering an adverse action could, under the logic of Arias, give rise to a retaliation claim. Then the comments rolled in:


As I said earlier, bad facts make bad law. Yes, the lawyer in this case blew the whistle to ICE and actively engaged with ICE agents to work a sting to detain and deport the plaintiff-employee. And that’s terrible if it was done, as it appears, for the purpose of gaining leverage in the wage/hour case.

But to hold the attorney liable for statutory retaliation against his non-employee establishes bad precedent. The Arias court does not rely on the degree of the attorney’s misconduct, or his active role in the ICE sting. The case hinges on its broad interpretation of the word “person” in the FLSA’s anti-retaliation provision.

To illustrate, let’s take this holding of Arias out of the context of its facts.

Suppose you’re outside employment-law counsel for a company. Your client calls you to request your help with an internal investigation. An employee has complained that her supervisor has been sexually harassing her. During that course of that investigation, you discover, through a review of the complaining employee’s corporate email, that she had not been performing her job. You report this malfeasance to your client, who fires the employee. She then sues for retaliation. Under the Arias holding, she can also sue the attorney. Before you tell me that Title VII defines retaliators differently than the FLSA, Ohio’s anti-retaliation provision in its employment discrimination law also defines its scope as “any person”. So while this result may be different under Title VII, under state laws like Ohio’s, Arias could work to hold an attorney liable.

Or, suppose you have an employee who takes FMLA leave for surgery. Let’s say during said FMLA leave, you discover that the employee is vacationing on a Caribbean island. And, further suppose that you discover this employee’s island vacay via his own public Facebook posts, which included photos of him on the beach, posing by a boat wreck, and in the ocean. As a result, you fire the employee for abusing and/or misusing FMLA leave by engaging in activities (verified by pictures posted on his Facebook page) that demonstrated his ability to return to work earlier than the end of the FMLA leave. Sound familiar? These are the exact facts of Jones v. Gulf Coast Health Care, which held the employer liable for FMLA retaliation. And, if that employer’s lawyer gives advice on the termination, under Arias, that lawyer could also be sued for retaliation.

I could go on, but you get the point. We attorneys need to be able to provide advice to our clients free from fear that our clients’ employees will sue us for retaliation when that advice results in termination, discipline, or some other adverse action.

We might win these cases more than we lose them, but we don’t want to be sued in these instances in the first place. Arias may have stepped over a line, but to use these facts to justify a broad rule makes it difficult for all management-side employment attorneys to do our jobs.

If you still disagree, the comment box is below.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on June 27, 2017June 29, 2023

9th Circuit’s Arias v. Raimondo Ruling May Be the Year’s Worst Employment Law Decision

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

I’ll be vacationing in California with my family the first two weeks of July.

After reading the 9th Circuit Court’s decision in Arias v. Raimondo — holding an employer’s attorney liable for FLSA retaliation against his client’s employee because the employee sued his client for unpaid overtime — I’m thinking of adding the 9th Circuit to my list of tourist stops in San Francisco to see if courthouse resembles a Salvador Dali painting. Because this decision is flat-out bonkers.

The facts are fairly simple. After José Arias sued his employer, Angelo Dairy, for unpaid overtime under the FLSA, he alleges that Angelo’s attorney, Anthony Raimondo, reported him to Immigration and Custom Enforcement as an undocumented worker and put a plan in motion for ICE agents to detain him for deportation as his deposition in the FLSA lawsuit.

Arias claimed that Raimondo, acting as Angelo’s agent, retaliated against him in violation of FLSA for filing his overtime lawsuit. Raimondo did not deny his role in setting up the sting, and claimed instead that he could not be liable under the FLSA for retaliating against someone who was never his employee.

The 9th Circuit sided with the employee.

In our case, the difference in reach between FLSA’s substantive economic provisions and its anti-retaliation provision is unmistakable. The wage and hours provisions focus on de facto employers, but the anti-retaliation provision refers to “any person” who retaliates. In turn, section 203(d) extends this concept to “any person acting directly or indirectly in the interest of an employer in relation to an employee.” Thus, Congress clearly means to extend [the anti-retaliation section]’s reach beyond actual employers. Raimondo’s activity in this case on behalf of his clients illustrates the wisdom of this extension.

The FLSA is “remedial and humanitarian in purpose. We are not here dealing with mere chattels or articles of trade but with the rights of those who toil, of those who sacrifice a full measure of their freedom and talents to the use and profit of others. … Such a statute must not be interpreted or applied in a narrow, grudging manner.”

Wow. As one friend put it, “The 9th circuit has officially lost its mind … .” We, as attorneys, should be free to advise our clients without fear of retribution from, or liability to, opposing parties in our client’s litigation. But, they say bad facts make bad law, and the attorney’s conduct in this case would certainly qualify as bad facts.

If you are looking for an employment attorney to help set up an ICE sting at a deposition to detain and deport a plaintiff in the hopes of prematurely ending a lawsuit, then I’m not your guy. In fact, if you asked me about this strategy, I would advise you about the liberal standard for retaliation (adverse action = any act that would reasonably deter one from exercising their statutory rights), and suggest that contacting ICE would likely subject you to a retaliation claim. I would not aid or abet that strategy, but would have to defend it if you overrode my advice and blew the whistle to ICE.

While this attorney may have crossed the line in this case, I am very concerned about a legal standard that appears to open the liability door to attorneys for retaliation against their clients’ employees.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on June 6, 2017June 29, 2023

Fight Unemployment Claims at Your Own Peril

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer

My friend and fellow blogger (with whom I tend to agree most of the time), Suzanne Lucas (aka Evil HR Lady), recently posted an article about which I could not agree more, Why You Should Rarely Fight an Unemployment Claim.

Her argument (which she agrees runs counter to most employers’ conventional wisdom that says, “I must fight each unemployment claim an employee files because successful unemployment claims cost money, and I do not like spending money”):

When you fire an employee, for whatever reason, they are likely to be angry. Most likely they think you were unfair. While you followed procedures and made decisions by the book, all it takes is this employee convincing an attorney that he was treated differently than other employees who were a different race, gender, religion, or other protected class, and you’re on the hook for thousands of dollars—not because you’re guilty of illegal discrimination. But, even responding to the attorney will cost you money, and it could cost you your reputation if the employee can garner public support. Cutting someone off from employment and unemployment makes people angry—and angry people will be far more likely to retaliate in court.

Let me give you a real-life example to support Suzanne’s astute argument that employers who fight unemployment claims create unhappy and angry ex-employees, which helps breed the right environment for lawsuits.

At the conclusion of a day-long plaintiff’s deposition in an FMLA and disability discrimination lawsuit, it was clear to me that my client had not only not violated any laws, but bent over backwards to do everything possible to accommodate the plaintiff. The company had treated this employee so well, I asked a question that I had never asked in another deposition — why are you suing?

It seems to me that they treated you fairly. They gave you an initial medical leave of more than 12 weeks, they provided you every accommodation you requested for your medical conditions, they provided you a second medical leave of more than 12 weeks, and you received several raises during your employment. Why are you suing this company?

The answer she gave floored me — not because it was damaging to my case, but because something that seemed so trifling caused the lawsuit. Her answer: “They fought my unemployment.”

Employees sue when they feel disrespected or when they perceive unfair treatment. It is not simply enough for an employer to treat employees well during their tenure. Employers should also strive to treat employees well in conjunction with their terminations and even thereafter. Sure, there are exceptions. I would never suggest that a serial harasser deserves a pass, or that the employee who stole from you should receive unemployment. If you don’t want to be sued, though, don’t make a terminated employee feel like a common criminal by having security escort them to the door (unless you legitimately and reasonably perceive a safety risk). It’s okay not to give a glowing recommendation to a marginal ex-employee, but resist the urge to trash him or her to a prospective employer. And, don’t fight unemployment except in the most clear-cut cases of cause. These little things could go a long way to an ex-employee reaching the decision to let bygones be bygones and not to sue you.

So think before filing that challenge to your ex-employee’s unemployment claim. It may be the smartest decision you can make.

Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

Posted on June 5, 2017June 29, 2023

A Contrary (and Common Sense) Appellate View on Rude Employees and the NLRA

Jon Hyman The Practical Employer
It’s been six weeks since I reported on NLRB v. Pier Sixty, in which the 2nd Circuit Court of Appeals held that the National Labor Relations Act protected the profanity-laced Facebook rant of a disgruntled employee.
I have hoped that Pier Sixty is an aberration. Thankfully, last week the 1st Circuit came along with a well reasoned contrarian view in a case in which the alleged employee misconduct was much less severe.
In Good Samaritan Med. Ctr. v. NLRB [pdf], the employer fired Camille Legley, a new probationary employee, who, in an employee orientation meeting, become increasingly contentious over the issue of whether he needed to join the union in order to work at the facility. Various employer witnesses described Legley’s conduct during the meeting-in-question as “irritated,” “talking loudly,” “consuming the room,” “rude,” and “overbearing.” Good Samaritan fired Legley the following day for violating its civility policy.

No one in the case disputed that Legley was engaging in protected activity under the NLRA in asserting a right not to join the union. The issue was whether his (mis)conduct crossed the line, and whether some reason other than his union opposition motivated Good Samaritan’s decision to fire him. On this issue, the 1st Circuit sided with the employer:

[W]e do not believe that the NLRB has established substantial evidence on the record as a whole that Good Samaritan would not have made its decision to discharge Legley despite the protected activity. Here, the NLRB simply stated that Good Samaritan failed to prove that it would have discharged Legley in the absence of his protected activity. At most this can be read to assert that Good Samaritan’s proffered reasons for discharging Legley were insufficient. … In the absence of an adverse credibility finding or a finding of pretext, the fair inference to be drawn from these statements is that Good Samaritan discharged Legley because of how it reasonably perceived his behavior not because of his protected conduct.

In other words, if an employer has a good faith belief that an employee’s conduct violates a policy, absent a finding that someone material to that decision is lying, or absent a finding of pretext, the NLRB cannot overturn the employer’s good faith decision.

Is it me, or did the 1st Circuit just incorporate the honest belief rule into NLRA jurisprudence? And, if that is, in fact, what just happened (and it sure looks that way), then bravo 1st Circuit. I stand up and applaud you. Because if a client called me with the facts of Good Samaritan, or, worse yet, Pier Sixty, and asked, “Can I fire this employee,” this is what I’d say:

I’m glad you called, because you are right to have concerns. Yes, this employee did mention a labor union, and he generally made his rude/insubordinate/offensive comments in the context of those union-related comments. The National Labor Relations Act has a concept called “protected concerted activity,” which grants all employees (whether in a labor union or not) the right, between and among themselves, to discuss wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment. That right certain protects comments relating to union elections and whether a new employee must join a union upon hiring. It does not, however, mean that employees check their dignity at the door. You should still have the right to fire or otherwise discipline a rude/insubordinate/offensive employee, even if the rude/insubordinate/offensive comments were made in context of otherwise protected concerted activity, as it appears is the case here.

Now, understand that the NLRB, as currently composed, takes a different view, as have some courts that have also examined this issue. But, also understand that the NLRB’s composition will change under President Trump, and it’s safe to assume that Trump’s NLRB will be less sympathetic to the argument that the NLRA protects employee comments and conduct such as those which you described to me. Would a decision to fire or otherwise discipline this employee be risk-proof or litigation-proof? Absolutely not; no decision ever is. But, you need to ask yourself, “Is this the type of employee I want working for me? Does this employee embody the values and exhibit the type of behavior that I want my employees to model?” If the answer is “no” (and I suspect it is, or you wouldn’t be calling me), and I was in your shoes, I know what decision I would make, as long as I understand that risks that may follow.

And I sure wouldn’t want the NLRB or a court second-guessing my client’s good faith business judgment in reaching its final decision.
Jon Hyman is a partner at Meyers, Roman, Friedberg & Lewis in Cleveland. Comment below or email editors@workforce.com. Follow Hyman’s blog at Workforce.com/PracticalEmployer.

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